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Introduction
 On July 17, 1998, one hundred and twenty
countries adopted a treaty in Rome to establish a
permanent International Criminal Court in The
Hague, Netherlands.1  This treaty is the
culmination of decades of advocacy by leading
human rights advocates around the world to
establish an international forum or mechanism by
which nations can  bring to justice individuals
who engage in atrocities against humanity.2
Inspired, inter alia, by the Nuremberg trials, and
the tribunals on war crimes for the former
Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, the treaty to create this
court is the product of the proceedings at the
United Nations’ “Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court,” or simply known
as the “Rome Conference.”3  The beneficial
attributes of such a permanent legal institution are
undeniable, but to date, several countries,
including the United States, although signatories
to the treaty, have refused to ratify on the grounds
of constitutional incompatibility, or, in the case of
the United States, the Court is perceived to be
adverse to national interest.4
The treaty required sixty countries to ratify the
statute creating the International Criminal Court
(ICC) before the Court could become operative.5
By May 20, 2002, sixty-six countries had ratified,
including the United Kingdom, and all members
of the European Union. Thus, having met the
necessary minimum, the Court became
operational on July 1, 2002.6  But for countries still
reluctant to ratify, and even for those that have
ratified, an operational question with serious
implications for the success or failure of the court
remains: How to arrest and surrender to the
International Criminal Court nationals of member
countries whose constitutional provisions forbid
such practice. A closely related issue is how to
reconcile a country’s constitutional immunities for
her public officials with the obligation to arrest
and deliver her citizens to foreign authorities.7
The United States, for example, although
instrumental in negotiating and developing the
due process rights of the accused embodied in the
treaty, ironically voted against  creation of the
Court. Only in the waning days of the Clinton
Administration did President Clinton, on
December 31, 2000, sign the treaty, thus making
the United States a signatory to the Rome
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2Conference.8  But the Bush Administration has
given all indications that it will not ratify, and for
many in the US Congress it is just as well, for,
detractors of the ICC in the US have become more
vociferous; but none more so than Senator Jesse
Helms, who on June 14, 2000, introduced a bill in
the Senate entitled the American Service Members
Protection Act (S. 2726).9  The bill, in substance,
would forbid any federal agency from cooperating
with the ICC, and would deny military assistance
to all foreign nations that ratify the treaty, except
NATO allies and other allies essential to  US
interest. While the bill has gone through hearings
in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and
the Committee on International Relations, it
remains pending as of this writing.
Mr. Helm’s bill is primarily based on the premise
that the Statute would deny accused Americans
due process rights guaranteed by the US
constitution. It specifically cites the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to
trial by jury, and the right to refuse making self-
incriminating statements. Mr. Helm could not
have been more mistaken! At the outset, it should
be clear that trial by jury is not applicable to
military personnel under the Fifth Amendment,
the text of which exempts this group from
coverage. The same holds true for the Sixth
Amendment. The other two rights, through the
efforts of the US negotiating team, are expressly
reserved to the accused by the Rome Statute, and
can be found in Art. 66 to Art. 69(7) of the
Statute.1 0
Objective
This paper presents a historical and legal
justification for the International Criminal Court,
and addresses the issue of potential
incompatibility of some of the Court’s articles of
formation with statutory provisions of the US
government. The focus is primarily on the
preconditions that will trigger the Court’s
jurisdictional competence, as embodied in Articles
12-14 of the Court’s Statute, and on why the US
government finds them incongruent to the US
national interest, even though all her allies in the
European Union have ratified the treaty.
Furthermore, my thesis suggests that the
Executive branch of the US government is
mistaken in its view that by not ratifying the
treaty, her nationals will not be subject to the
Court’s jurisdiction. This view will be shown to be
incorrect by analyzing the process whereby States
that are party to the treaty can refer cases to the
Court so long as they are in possession of the
offender regardless of the offender’s nationality.
Thus, France, for example, may arrest a US citizen
on her soil for crimes against humanity and may, if
she wishes, refer the case to the International
Criminal Court even though the US is not a party
to the Statute. In the final analysis, my thesis will
demonstrate that it will be in the US national
interest to ratify the treaty, and by so doing, create
the opportunity to effectively exercise
considerable influence on the Court.
Part II.Formation and Structure of the Court
The momentum for a permanent International
Criminal Court was revived by initiatives from
Trinidad and Tobago in 1989 to combat
international trafficking in illicit narcotic drugs,
and the attendant criminal activities.1 1 This
provided the needed impetus that galvanized one
hundred and twenty-four Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs), seventeen
intergovernmental organizations, fourteen
specialized agencies and funds of the United
Nations, and one hundred and sixty countries to
convene in Rome for a conference that gave birth
to a permanent court to prosecute and punish
those accused of the worst atrocities against
mankind.1 2
The Rome Statute established the ICC and imbued
it with considerable power to exercise jurisdiction
over proscribed crimes of international concern.1 3
The crimes for which the court may exercise
jurisdiction are crimes against humanity, genocide,
war crimes, and crimes of aggression. The statute,
to be formally known as the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, was adopted by a
non-recorded vote of 120 countries in favor, 7
3against, and 21 abstentions.1 4 Immediately
following adoption of the Rome Statute, the UN’s
General Assembly constituted the Preparatory
Commission  (PrepCom) to establish for the Court
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and the
elements of the various crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court. On June 30, 2000, the
rules and elements of crime produced by the
Preparatory Commission were adopted.1 5
During the conference proceedings, three major
groups were clearly visible. One of the more active
was the group of Like-Minded states made-up of
mostly Europeans and  some developing
countries. Their primary objective was to see the
creation of a strong and independent court.
Another group of note was the P-5, the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council;
in unity, all members of the group pushed for: (1)
that the Security Council maintain a strong
influence and presence in the court, and (2) that
the Rome Statute not include nuclear weapons as
prohibited weapons of mass destruction. A third
group, which included Egypt, India, Mexico, and a
few other developing countries, argued strongly
that nuclear weapons be banned, and at the
same time advocated for a jurisdictionally weaker
and less independent court.1 6
Before the final vote on the statute in the plenary
session, India and the United States attempted to
introduce amendments to the final draft. Although
these attempts were defeated, such motions
underscored the fact that the final draft did not
fully address the needs of conference participants.
India, for example wanted the statute to include
provisions that would allow the United Nations
Security Council to refer cases to the Court, or for
the Court to defer consideration of a case that the
Security Council has jurisdiction under its Chapter
VII powers for 12 months. Second, India wanted
the final draft to include a list of weapons of mass
destruction, such as nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, whose use is considered a
serious violation of the laws of international
armed conflict.1 7 The United States, on the other
hand, was primarily concerned with the court’s
jurisdiction over nationals of non-signatories to
the statute. Specifically, the US wanted the statute
to include a provision to allow the court to
exercise jurisdiction over citizens of non-
signatories only if the State expressly recognizes
such jurisdiction. The motion failed.1 8
The protection of information relevant to national
security was strongly stressed by the US. In light
of the proceedings at the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, it was obvious
that materials, though relevant to the trial, may
compromise security interests of States supplying
the information. The US argued that affected
national governments should have the right to
refuse compliance with a request from the Court
for sensitive information. Article 72 of the Statute
adopted the US position; it grants a national
government the right of first refusal in instances
where the request implicates national security
interests in conformance with Article 93 sec. 4.
When a refusal occurs, the Court may either
appeal to the Assembly of States Parties or go
directly to the UN Security Council for remedy.1 9
Two of the more difficult issues of contention at
the Rome Conference were the inclusion of crimes
against women, and Due Process Rights. Experts
in women rights issues in the NGOs and the US
delegation insisted that explicit language be used
to express sexual assaults in the final draft of the
Statute. Articles 7(1), 8(2)(b) (xxii) and (e)(vi)
contain the various forms of violence against
women that come within the jurisdiction of the
court …..enforced prostitution, sexual slavery,
rape, forced pregnancy, and enforced sterilization.
The second issue, Due Process protection for
defendants, seriously engaged the efforts of the US
delegation. From the US perspective such
protection was necessary in order for the Statute to
satisfy the US constitutional requirements in all
criminal prosecution. The final draft adequately
addressed the rights of the defendant, and the
limits of the prosecutor’s power in parts 5-8 of the
Statute.2 0
4Governance and Structure
The Court will be governed by the Assembly of
States Parties consisting of all states that have
ratified the Rome Statute. When fully operational,
the Court shall comprise four divisions – the
Presidency; Pre-Trial, Trial, and Appeals; the
Prosecutor; and the Registry. Eighteen judges will
serve in different capacities in the Court’s four
divisions in any given time period, and all judges
will be elected to the Court for a non-renewable
term of nine years by the Assembly of States
Parties. The office of the Prosecutor is also subject
to the same terms.2 1
Articles 12-14 of the Statute stipulate certain
conditions that must exist before the Court can
invoke its jurisdictional powers. When a State
Party refers a case to the Prosecutor, Article 12
specifically requires that “the Court may exercise
its jurisdiction if one or more of the following
States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted
the jurisdiction of the Court…..by declaration
lodged with the Registrar… (a) The State or the
territory of which the conduct in question
occurred or, if the crime was committed on board
a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that
vessel or aircraft; (b) The State of which the person
accused of the crime is a national.”2 2 In addition to
cases that pertain solely to individual culpability,
some ICC cases will focus on the lawfulness of
official acts of nations. While individuals and not
states will be indicted, there will be instances in
which individuals are indicted for official acts
undertaken as part of the State’s official policy and
with the State’s authorization.
In the final analysis, the court created by the Rome
Statute is a treaty-based institution with enormous
powers to investigate and punish. However, the
Court may defer to national courts already in the
process of investigating or prosecuting a case, but
may, nonetheless, launch its own investigation if it
deems the national court’s efforts insufficient or the
result inadequate. In terms of funding, the Court’s
activities will be financed by dues paid by states that
are signatory to the Statute, and fees from the UN
Security Council for cases it refers to the Court.2 3
Part III. The International CriminalCourt as a Treaty-Based Institution
The League of Nations, and the United Nations
are manifestations of the perennial search for
peaceful resolutions of international conflicts since
the first and second world wars. Indeed, political
debates in the US in terms of her proper role in the
international arena   soon after both wars
remarkably shaped the formation of both
institutions. The League of Nations, principally
advanced by President Woodrow Wilson’s
administration, was short-lived due to isolationist
forces in the US Senate.2 4 The United Nations, for
a very different reason, almost suffered a similar
fate; the ideological and economic struggles
between the super powers during the cold war
essentially rendered the UN powerless, and
prevented it from assuming the role it was
originally designed for; to maintain international
peace and security. The experiences of these
international bodies, and the impact of US foreign
policies on their respective capacities as
international institutions, have raised doubts
about the viability of the ICC in the absence of
strong US support.2 5
The International Criminal Court is accorded,
under the Rome Statute, a limited and residual
treaty-based jurisdiction. The jurisdictional scope
of the Court is further curtailed by other
provisions in the statute that ensure the primacy of
jurisdiction is maintained by the territorial
sovereign or the country of nationality of the
accused. Unless and until the territorial sovereign
or the country in question is unable or unwilling
to conduct a genuine investigation or prosecute
the accused, the Court will assert its jurisdiction.2 6
This residual jurisdiction of the Court complies
with recognized standards of international
jurisdictional arrangement that allows nations to
have jurisdiction over criminal acts committed
within the country’s territory regardless of the
offender’s nationality, and affords nations
jurisdiction over their nationals regardless of
where the crime against the individual country’s
laws are committed.2 7
5The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
emphatically expressed that treaties can not create
obligations for non-parties.2 8 The US, in opposing
the treaty, has consistently pointed to this
fundamental principle of international law, and
claims that the Rome Statute, by providing the
ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals, violates
the law of treaties. But this position misses the
mark because the Rome Statute does not, in any of
its provisions, impose obligations on non-party
states. As discussed immediately below, the non-
party state is not obligated to do anything it does
not wish to do; indeed, it is perfectly free to refuse
to cooperate when asked so long as it has physical
custody of the accused.
Customary International Law and Treaties
It is axiomatic in international law that non-
signatories to a treaty may not be subject to the
rules and obligations created by such treaty.2 9 But
there are exceptions; when a tribunal is formed to
prosecute violations of customary international
laws with universal jurisdictional ambit and still
extant at the formation of the tribunal, the
tribunal’s jurisdictional competence can no longer
be assumed to be limited only to signatories to the
treaty.3 0 Obligations, duties and responsibilities
under international laws are universal. Thus, if a
country such as South Africa, has in her custody a
French national accused of war crimes as defined
in customary international law, South Africa has
the jurisdictional competence, and responsibility
to try the accused, or surrender him to another
body or country with competent jurisdiction. This
is the essence of universal competence and
responsibility; it is of no consequence that the
accused is a South African national, or whether the
victims are Australians, and the crimes occurred in
Zimbabwe. Any country would have the same
competence and responsibility under international
law.
Again, under customary international law, South
Africa can invite other countries to jointly create a
tribunal to try the accused French national in her
control. Such a tribunal would have universal
competence, and its decisions would have the
force of international law as evidenced by the
Nuremberg Tribunal.3 1 In the Nuremberg trials,
the US, France, Britain, and the Soviet Union
formed the International Military Tribunal to try
German nationals even though Germany was not
a signatory to the tribunal. The International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, in justification of
its powers, stated:
“ The Signatory Powers[to the London Agreement
of 8 August 1945 creating the Charter of the IMT at
Nuremberg] created this tribunal… and made
regulations for the proper conduct of the trial. In
doing so, they have done together what any one of
them might have done singly, for it is not to be
doubted that any nation has the right to set up
special courts to administer the law. With regard
to the constitution of the Court, all the defendants
are entitled to ask is to receive a fair trial on the
facts and law.”3 2
By refusing to ratify the Statute, with the
expectation that US nationals will not be subject to
the Court’s jurisdiction, the Bush Administration
is either denying the implications of universal
competence and responsibility or wants the
international community to make an exception for
the US. From the Nuremberg experience, it is clear
that under international law, countries can
implement a formal tribunal with or without
participation by the country whose national is the
subject of the criminal proceeding. Thus, in
Nuremberg, it was not necessary for Germany to
consent to the formation of the tribunal even
though some of the crimes committed by the
Nazis did not occur in Britain, the United States or
in France. It was equally unnecessary that the
individuals prosecuted be nationals of countries
forming the tribunal.
The U.N. General Assembly’s declarations on war
against humanity and war crimes imply a general
obligation for nations to assist in the prosecution
of international crimes, and to engage in
multilateral efforts to prevent future occurrences.
The U.N. Assembly’s declarations, in part, state:
6“States shall co-operate with each other on a
bilateral and multilateral basis with a view to
halting and preventing war crimes and crimes
against humanity, and shall take the domestic and
international measures necessary for that purpose.
States shall assist each other in detecting, arresting
and bringing to trial persons suspected of having
committed such crimes; States shall not grant
asylum to any such person.”3 3
Thus, given the competence of South Africa as a
member of the United Nations, she can take part
in the formation of an international criminal
tribunal to try a French national held in her
territory for war crimes. By virtue of this
competence, it follows that South Africa can also
refer cases to the International Criminal Court
even if she is not party to the Rome Statute, but
must accept the jurisdiction of the Court by special
declarations. Hence she can deliver a war crime
suspect to the Court with the proviso that she is
not barred from doing so by constitutive treaty.
Under the universal jurisdictional umbrella,
France, whose national is the subject of the
criminal proceeding, also need not be a party to
the Statute in order for the Court to have
jurisdictional competence.
The plain reading of Article 13 of the Rome Statute
makes clear that the Court, upon the invitation of
a State Party, may exercise jurisdiction over the
referred case in accordance to the provisions of
Article 14, which in turn simply requires that the
crimes be within the jurisdiction of the Court, and
that the crimes appear to have been committed.3 4
This understanding of the Court’s jurisdiction is
confirmed by Mahnoush Arsanjani, Secretary of
the “Committee of the Whole” at the Rome
Conference: “The Court will have jurisdiction…
even if committed in non-party states by nationals
of non-party states and in the absence of consent
by the territorial state or the state of nationality of
the accused.”3 5
The legal essence of Article 14 is to virtually make
the ratification of the Statute by non-conforming
states inconsequential once the required number
of signatories is met. By granting the ICC
jurisdiction over non-party states, Article 14 makes
it possible for the Court to exercise jurisdiction
over any individual so long as the state where the
crimes took place consents or the country in which
the accused is a national consents. In light of
Articles 13 and 14, the Court will be able to
exercise limited universal jurisdiction.3 6
 In the example given above, where South Africa
has in her custody a French national accused of
war crimes, it is possible for France to initiate her
own investigation of the matter, but this will only
grant her prescriptive jurisdiction, just like any
other state interested in the matter. However,
under Article 17 of the Statute, so long as South
Africa has enforcement jurisdiction, she can
surrender the accused to the ICC or refer the case
to the prosecutor. Thus, the possession of
prescriptive jurisdiction by the state which the
accused claims as his country of origin does not
preclude another state with enforcement
jurisdiction from surrendering the accused to the
Court. Furthermore, since international human
rights law forbids a state from trying the accused
in absentia, the French, while possessing
prescriptive jurisdiction may not be able to try her
national if South Africa retains custody.
Articles 89(1) and 90(4)-(6) also provide the Court
jurisdiction over nationals of non-signatories to
the Statute.3 7 In instances where a requesting state
has jurisdictional competence but is not a
signatory to the Statute, Article 90 confers
competency and primacy to the Court. Thus, if a
non-signatory to the Statute, such as the United
States,  has nationality jurisdiction, and makes a
request of a State Party to surrender or extradite
her national for prosecution in other to circumvent
the Court, the State Party shall give priority to the
Court’s request for jurisdiction if the Court
ascertains that the case is admissible, and that the
State Party is not obligated under international
law to extradite the accused to the requesting non-
signatory. In effect, Article 90 clearly establishes
that the Court shall have the power to determine
whether the case is admissible when a non-
7signatory requests extradition of her nationals
from a signatory state. If the case is admissible, the
Court may exercise its jurisdiction.3 8
The US Objections
For its supporters, the ICC is an overdue addition
to the host of international institutions now
operative, and a natural progression from the
Nuremberg Tribunal, and the ad hoc war tribunals
for Rwanda and Bosnia.3 9 But for its detractors,
the real objective of the ICC supporters, as they
perceive it, is to assert the supremacy of its
authority over nation states, and to promote
prosecution over alternative methods for dealing
with the worst criminal offenses against humanity.
In this vein, Richard Belton writes:
“In fact, the Court and the prosecutor are
illegitimate. The ICC’s principal failing is that its
components do not fit into a coherent
“constitutional” design that delineates clearly how
laws are made, adjudicated, and enforced, subject
to popular accountability and structured to protect
liberty. Instead, the Court and the prosecutor are
simply “out there” in the international system.
This approach is clearly inconsistent with
American standard of constitutional order, and is,
in fact, a stealth approach to erode our
constitutionalism. That is why this issue is, first
and foremost, a liberty question.”4 0
To the more pronounced detractors of the Court in
the US, the Court’s basic inadequacies stem from
the robustness of the crimes that fall within the
Court’s jurisdiction. For instance, the crime of
genocide as defined by the Court will run counter
to the US Senate’s position adopted in February
1986 when it attached two reservations, five
understandings, and one declaration before
approving the Genocide Convention of 1947.
However, Article 120 of the Rome Statute
explicitly provides that “.. no reservations may be
made to this statute..”,4 1 thus for the US to fully
recognize the Court’s jurisdiction over her citizens,
the Senate’s position on the crime of genocide will
have to change in order to comply with the
Court’s stipulation.
However, the principal objection raised by the US
during the conference in Rome and in the
meetings of the Preparatory Commission was that
US military personnel could, in discharging their
duties around the world, be charged and tried by
the Court without US consent. A more recent, and
less than obvious self-serving formulation of the
same objection is that the Rome Statute allows the
Court to try nationals of a nonparty country
without the consent of the country.4 2 Based on this
new formulation, the US then attempted to
include in the treaty a clause that will prevent the
Court from exercising jurisdiction over nationals
of nonparty countries unless the Court first
obtains the consent of the nonparty country to try
her national. The overall effect of this proposal
would be to afford US nationals a blanket
protection from the Court as long as the US
remains a nonparty state. But it would also
provide the same protection from rogue nations
that are more likely than not to engage in the type
of atrocities the Court is designed to guard
against, and allow savage dictators to elude the
Court’s jurisdictional reach. Such undesirable
outcome was enough ground for all NATO allies,
except Turkey, to reject the proposal.4 3
While most of the European, and NATO allies
found this US proposal unacceptable for obvious
reasons, the proposal also points to a long-held
view that the US may be inclined to hegemonic
tendencies in view of the fact that the proposal
was, and continues to be, based on arguments
inconsistent with customary international law.4 4
Specifically, that international law does not permit
a treaty-based institution to exercise jurisdiction
over nationals of nonparty states unless the
affected state consents. But this is not the
customary understanding or interpretation of
international treatises, for while a nonparty state is
not herself bound to accept such jurisdiction
unless she consents, this, however, does not hold
true for nationals of nonparty states when they
violate laws of a sovereign state and are within the
territory of that state. Customary international law
does not prohibit a territorial sovereign from
exercising jurisdiction over an offender of any
8national within her territorial reach even if the
offender is acting under the auspices of a nonparty
state. Moreover, once such jurisdiction is exercised
over the offender, the territorial sovereign is free to
extradite the offender to a third party state or
institution.
This ability by the territorial sovereign to try or
extradite an offender within her jurisdiction
should have been enough reason to persuade the
US to ratify the treaty because, under the Rome
Statute, the Court must engage due-process
protection and rules of evidence already written
into the statute. This is a major benefit that would
otherwise not be available to the accused in the
courts of many nations.
A second point of objection raised by the US is that
the prosecutor would exercise inordinate
prosecutorial power to the extent that US foreign
policy will be subject to the exercise of such
power.4 5 But this argument misses the point, for
the prosecutor cannot initiate an investigation
without first securing an approval from a three-
member pretrial chamber. Moreover, when an
authorization to investigate is secured, all affected
states must be notified of the decision to
investigate; and once such notice is issued the
complementarity provision again controls. The
state of nationality of the accused and the host
nation have the option to assert primary
jurisdiction and retain the right to investigate.
Given this provision, it is hard to imagine a
situation where the US will decline primary
jurisdiction.  And even when the prosecutor
decides that the outcome was unacceptable and
elects to remove the case to the ICC, the
investigating state has the right under the Rome
Statute to challenge the prosecutor’s decision in
the pretrial chamber, and to appeal to the
appellate division of the Court. It must also be
noted that the fear or specter of politically
motivated or unjust prosecutions is properly
ameliorated by the fact that the ICC can only try
the accused if it has custody; the Statute prohibits
it from trying individuals in abstentia.4 6
So far, US negotiators are yet to come to terms
with their inability to convince other Party-States
that because the US shoulders certain obligations
in the global arena, some provisions of the Rome
Statute should be modified to reflect this unique
set of responsibilities. In observance of this
frustrating dilemma, Bruce Broomhall of Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, an active
participant in the Rome Conference, wrote:
“Unable to offer credible “carrots,” decisive
“sticks,” or viable legal arguments, the United
States finds herself on “a lonely legal ledge,” able
neither to go forward nor step back. Asking for
concessions it cannot win in a process it can
neither leave nor oppose, the United States has so
far resisted coming to terms with the limits of its
ability to control the ICC process. It has also
resisted the recognition that its reasons to support
the ICC far outweigh its reasons to oppose it.”4 7
Part IV. Conclusion
The current formulation of the US position is
based on a controversial view of customary
international law, namely, that customary
international law forbids or at least does not
authorize a treaty-based international court to
exercise jurisdiction over nationals of a nonparty
state when they act under the direction of the
nonparty state. The fault in this line of reasoning is
that, in the absence of some specific agreements,
the jurisdiction of the state in which the crime was
committed will prevail over any other claim of
jurisdiction. It also ignores the fact that territorial
jurisdiction prevails over jurisdiction based on
nationality. But even in the likely event that the
prosecutor challenges the conclusion of the
investigating state, that state has a right under the
treaty to contest such challenge in the pretrial
chamber, as well as a right to an expedited
interlocutory appeal to the appellate chamber of
the ICC.4 8
Right up to the final vote on the Rome Statute in
1998, and ever since, the US has made remarkable
efforts to secure changes to the statute that would
make it acceptable, and enable her to sign the
9treaty, first by suggesting amendments in the text,
and proposing “agreed interpretations” of various
provisions.4 9 More recently, the US negotiating
team  proposed several clauses in the relationship
agreement between the proposed new Court and
the United Nations that would exempt certain US
nationals from application of the Court’s
jurisdiction so long as the US is not a party or
unless the US gives its consent on a case-by-case
basis. None of these suggestions was accepted,
and most were rejected summarily by the Like-
Minded group that constituted the dominant
voting bloc in the conference.5 0
The US, from all indications, will not ratify the
treaty as currently constituted, and thus will not
participate in the establishment of a permanent
international criminal court as envisioned in the
Rome Statute. Absence of US participation will
have both long-run and short- run implications.
The long-run effects on the Court will be serious
indeed, for the Court will lack the support of a
country with the most extensive economic and
military resources amongst the nations, and may
be inclined to use her might to frustrate the
Court’s efforts. But the long-run effects will be
equally serious for the US in terms of the
consequences that attend isolationism in an era of
global interdependency.
In the short-run the effects are rather immediate,
for it calls into question the credibility of the US in
supporting and defending international human
rights abroad in the recent past, and its open
declaration of support in principle for the
establishment of a permanent international
criminal court. By not becoming a member of the
Assembly of States Parties at the early stages of
the Court’s development, the US may have
irreparably damaged her chances to help shape
and define essential aspects of the Court such as
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Elements
of Crimes, Due-Process protection for the accused,
and the crucial role of the United Nations in
recommending cases for prosecution.
Furthermore, by standing aloof, the US loses the
opportunity to participate in the selection and
appointment of the first batch of judges and the
prosecutor, and simultaneously denies her
nationals eligibility for the Court’s judicial
appointments.
A fundamental foreign policy and national
security issue of remarkable interest to the US and
her military personnel is the definition of the
crime of aggression by the Rome Statute.5 1 But this
crime is yet to be fully defined and agreed upon
by the Assembly of State Parties therefore, the
absence of the US at this stage will almost
guarantee that the final version of the crime of
aggression will be a further obstacle to US full
participation. The salient point to be stressed here
is that the Rome Statute provides the US the better
alternative in terms of protecting her armed forces
accused of international crimes in foreign
countries, because under the complementarity
provisions of the Statute, the ICC will only act if
the sending country is unwilling or unable to try
the case. But since the US has perennially insisted
on having sole jurisdiction over her military
personnel, the Statute affords her this preference
that would otherwise be unavailable under the
regime of territorial jurisdiction.
NOTES
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
adopted on July 17, 1998. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
183/9 (1998).
2 See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (1998). Crimes
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